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Editorial: 
Signs and communicators
Paul Cobley, Adrian Pablé, Johan Siebers
On 9 and 10 January 2019 the Language and Communication Research Cluster 
at Middlesex University London hosted the first Middlesex Roundtable on Signs, 
Language and Communication, with the theme “Integrationism, Biosemiotics, 
Philosophy of Communication”. The roundtable aimed at creating an opportunity 
for dialogue among representatives of these approaches to the study of com-
munication. The workshop was the result of the joint effort of the research cluster, 
the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies, the International Association 
for the Integrational Study of Language and Communication (IAISLC) and the 
Section for Philosophy of Communication of the European Communication 
Research and Education Association (ECREA).
We are grateful for having the opportunity, offered to us by one of the partici-
pants in the Roundtable, Kalevi Kull, to prepare this issue of Sign Systems Studies 
on the basis of a selection of the papers presented at the workshop.
While there are vast differences in aims and orientation of the three fields 
that the workshop brought together, there are also similarities. Integrationism, 
the language and communication theory of Roy Harris, seeks to dispel what it 
calls the ‘language myth’: the idea that language is an entirely separate mode 
of communication, that languages are systems of abstract linguistic signs, that 
linguistic communication involves the transmission or reproduction of mental 
content between individuals. Harris uses the dismissive term ‘telementation’ for 
the latter view, an implicit assumption in our lay thinking about how linguistic 
communication works. Instead, integrationism holds, the sign is a ubiquitous 
feature of all experience, is radically contextualized and individual, and is that 
by which a subject “integrates” what it encounters in the constitution of its being. 
Signs come into being the moment they are needed and they perish as soon as an 
individual act of integration has been completed. Not only language is a practice 
of integration; any relationality that we can think of comes about on the basis of 
integrating cotemporal activities of various kinds. Integrationism takes the radical 
nature of its proposal seriously: as sign-making is a radically contextual and 
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individual affair, there is no objective outsider-perspective, no view from no where 
that could claim priority with respect to the nature of first-order sign-making 
practices as they occur in real life. We are always our own best communication 
theorists, as we know what we are doing when we communicate. We are after all 
the ones who are doing it. This implies that we can say nothing about non-human 
communicators and the world that they live in.  Integrationism is a humanism 
by default. Linguistics as a science has no place in integrationist thought; rather, 
integrationism invites us to think of linguistics, first of all in terms of a wider, 
more generalized communication theory of semiological integration and secondly, 
as a reflection on communication that is part and parcel of our existence as 
communicative agents. Linguistics is the whole field of communication about 
communication, radically anarchistic and democratic, if you will, in which 
everyone has equal rights to a seat at the table when it comes to articulating what 
communication is. The theory of communication itself (an activity that does 
have some insights to convey, after all) is just one aspect of the reflexive nature of 
language use that accompanies us as we live our sign-making lives; it can claim 
no priority of pre-eminence; if someone happens to find themselves puzzled by 
certain questions about what happens when we communicate, they may find help 
there, but that is all. 
The field of biosemiotics shares with integrationism the aim of relaxing 
the ontological divide between language and the world, although it does so 
with a slightly different purview. In the landmark volume which first tested 
the ‘integration’ of semiotics and integrationism, providing the impetus for the 
Roundtable, Adrian Pablé and Christopher Hutton (2015: 18) wrote, “The relation -
ship between the individual self, the species and the environment is of central 
concern to semiotic theory. Whereas integrationism takes a largely anthropocentric 
view of the self, post-Peircean semiotics views human beings within a much wider 
biosemiotic frame”.  For most biosemioticians the making and using of signs is 
not limited to human conscious, mediated communication. Inspired by the 
discovery of the genetic code at work in the heart of the repro duction of life, 
biosemiotics has, over the years, developed a paradigm for the study of signs 
that universalizes semiosis to life as such, and for some even into the inorganic 
realm, looking at the function of information in the constitution, preservation 
and transformation of matter and in causal relations. Typically, for biosemiotics, 
sign-making and sign-using or sign-interpreting does, in some areas, fall back 
on a code; but the ontological status of the code is not fixed universally and in 
advance. As biosemiotics has developed, it has sought to shake off its philosophical 
swaddling clothes and understand itself as a scientific theory about life, capable 
of experimental verification, refining and further development. Biosemiotics is 
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not, to use a Harrisian term, lay-oriented, in that it does not see the process of 
semiosis as radically inaccessible to anyone other than the agents engaged in it. 
Much of the dialogue between biosemiotics and integrationism hinges on the 
question as to the status of the “language myth”: is the mythical reification of 
code, eschewed by biosemiotics but present in earlier incarnations of sign theory, 
perhaps an inevitable dimension of semiosis, one that we can subsequently free 
ourselves from, if we are so propelled, but nevertheless an operative fiction in the 
organization and evolution of ever more complex forms of interaction? 
Whereas these two paradigms can rightly claim their status as full-fledged 
theoretical proposals about the nature of communication and semiosis, the 
philosophy of communication is rather more a disciplinary sub-field than a 
single paradigm. The term ‘philosophy of communication’ has been around 
for some time, although as yet there are only a few people who identify their 
thinking as such. Most of these are gathered together in ECREA’s Philosophy 
of Communication Section, an association of scholars set up by Johan Siebers 
and Tino Meitz shortly after the foundation of ECREA with the explicit aim to 
stimulate work at the interface of communication studies and philosophy. While 
communication has been a well-established topic of interest to philosophers 
from pre-Socratic times onwards, there has been relatively little attention to the 
way in which an orientation toward communication can provide new ways of 
thinking about philosophical questions. From the beginning, the Section sought 
to create opportunities for philosophical thought about communication, but also 
for communicative thought about philosophy. As a consequence, philosophy of 
communication distinguishes itself from communication theory, the plethora of 
conceptualizations of communication that inform the field of communication 
studies. Philosophy is perhaps part of theory, but if so in a distinctive way, 
concerned with distinctive questions, perspectives, approaches and methods (to 
the extent to which philosophy can be said to have a method or be methodical at 
all). None of the boundaries are non-porous here, but philosophers of commu-
nication have been adamant about philosophy as a sui generis activity within the 
broader, inclusive notion of theory. Where will the philosophy of communication 
go? It seems that the world today has more need than ever to develop new, more 
penetrating ways of thinking about communication and its place in our lives. 
Many institutions, cultural practices and values are undergoing profound and 
still often poorly understood transformations in the wake of the communication 
revolutions of the past decades, with wide-ranging ethical, epistemological and 
political effects. It could well be that we have to allow our understanding of 
communication to fertilize what we mean by ethics, epistemology and political 
thinking (and, as one contribution in this issue argues, also what we mean by 
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ontology and metaphysics) before philosophy can usefully address the most 
fundamental dimensions of these changes and provide new orientations for praxis. 
The dialogue between philosophy, integrationism and biosemiotics is one example 
of exploring that fertilization.
This issue starts with a contribution by Charlotte Conrad, who investigates 
the idea of reality as a construct based on pragmatic semiosis, conceptualized 
along integrationist lines. The notion of reality as interface emerges as result. Peter 
Kastberg writes about reciprocal dynamics of dialogue and uses constructivist 
approaches to develop a communication-philosophical physiognomy of dialogic 
interaction. 
Next, two empirical studies explore the relevance of some of the conceptualiza-
tions of our paradigms in understanding mediated communication. Cary Bazal-
gette discusses her work on the early stages of learning to read film and TV, while 
Dorthe Duncker considers the case of chatbots through the lens of Harrisian 
sign-making, and addresses questions of subjectivity and personhood in human-
computer dialogic interaction. 
The third section of this issue deals with more strictly theoretical and critical 
questions. Chris Farnham explores the relevance of Peirce’s notion of the object 
as a way of making Hegelian dialectical thinking fruitful for understanding 
semiosis. Adrian Pablé investigates if – and if so, how – aspects of biosemiotics 
might be integrated into integrationism; the question of the default humanism of 
the integrationist understanding of sign-making is opened up and examined here. 
Johan Siebers’ contribution looks at the ontology of communication and sketches 
the outlines of a programme for such an ontology, in which communication is 
theorized in terms of being and being in terms of communication. Finally, Paul 
Cobley’s contribution speaks to the theme of the radical subjectivity of sign-making 
in integrationism by discussing the work of leading integrationist Christopher 
Hutton and providing a critical biosemiotic perspective on personhood.
We wish the reader a pleasurable and hopefully enriching time, joining the 
authors on their explorations along new and untrodden pathways into the vast 
and fascinating landscape of communication, and developing their own thoughts 
on some of these questions as they go. For whether we subscribe, in the end, to the 
radical humanism of integrationism or not, the semiotically self-conscious words 
of Schopenhauer ring true: “Thoughts reduced to paper are generally nothing 
more than the footprints of a man walking in the sand. It is true that we see the 
path he has taken; but to know what he saw on the way, we must use our own eyes” 
(Schopenhauer 1974: §291).
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